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Abstract— Data generated by cars is growing at an unprece-
dented scale. As cars gradually become part of the Internet of
Things (IoT) ecosystem, several stakeholders discover the value
of in-vehicle network logs containing the measurements of the
multitude of sensors deployed within the car. This wealth of data
is also expected to be exploitable by third parties for the purpose
of profiling drivers in order to provide personalized, value-
added services. Although several prior works have successfully
demonstrated the feasibility of driver re-identification using
the in-vehicle network data captured on the vehicle’s CAN
(Controller Area Network) bus, they inferred the identity
of the driver only from known sensor signals (such as the
vehicle’s speed, brake pedal position, steering wheel angle, etc.)
extracted from the CAN messages. However, car manufacturers
intentionally do not reveal exact signal location and semantics
within CAN logs. We show that the inference of driver identity
is possible even with off-the-shelf machine learning techniques
without reverse-engineering the CAN protocol. We demonstrate
our approach on a dataset of 33 drivers and show that a driver
can be re-identified and distinguished from other drivers with
an accuracy of 75-85%.
I. INTRODUCTION
Almost all vehicles in use nowadays are equipped with
various on-board Electrical Control Units (ECUs), sensors
and actuators measuring and controlling the vehicle’s speed,
acceleration, braking, fuel consumption, battery status, or
tire pressure level, among others. Sensors attached to their
respective ECUs, whose number ranges from 5 to a hundred
per vehicle, continuously generate a vast amount of real-
time data. In order to implement complex control tasks for
traffic safety or passenger infotainment, these data are then
transferred among ECUs and other nodes over the in-vehicle
network, most commonly following the Controller Area
Network (CAN bus) standard [1]. In addition to being used
real-time for automotive control, data are also transferred
to car manufacturers through Internet-connected devices or
pre-installed modems every half to five minutes. Apart from
diagnostic and forensics purposes of car companies and their
primary data analytics partners, these huge datasets also
become exploitable by other parties such as insurance com-
panies, retailers, advertisers and parking operators; in gen-
eral, vehicular data gradually become part of the Internet of
Things (IoT) ecosystem1. Moreover, upcoming autonomous
cars produce and may share an order of magnitude larger
amount of real-time data (≈ 1 GB/s) than traditional cars.
Indeed, data from vehicles are predicted to create a $10
1www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2018/05/08/how-well-does-
your-car-know-you/
trillion market and could become five times bigger than the
market for the cars themselves in the next few years2.
Unfortunately, sharing in-vehicle network data raises seri-
ous privacy concerns. Although drivers are expected to opt-in
to such data sharing3, it is still unclear what exact personal
information they would transfer then to third parties. For
example, can a skilled data analyst infer the driver’s identity
using only in-vehicle network data? Despite the inherently
noisy nature of this fine-grained measurement data, the
feasibility of driver identification has been demonstrated in
several prior works [2], [3], [4], [5]. In particular, it is
well-known that drivers can be re-identified in constrained
environments if they follow the same route with the same
car and sensor readings are available from the captured
network logs [2]. However, when following different routes,
unique driving patterns are more difficult to extract due to the
variable traffic conditions. Also, it is much more plausible
that an adversary is able to collect CAN logs from arbitrary
routes, hence we stick with this scenario throughout this
paper. Moreover, car manufacturers do not disclose the exact
format of CAN messages in order to protect their intellectual
properties against competitors, as well as the security of
drivers against malicious car hacking. But is this approach
of security/privacy by obscurity effective?
A straightforward solution could be to reverse-engineer the
CAN protocol by extracting different sensor signals, such as
velocity, steering wheel angle, etc., from the captured CAN
messages. However, this requires the manual inspection of
every possible time series whether they contain a given signal
with sufficient predictive power. This process is tedious and
often considered to be illegal [6].
In this paper, we show that there is no need to reverse-
engineer the CAN protocol to identify drivers. In addi-
tion, re-identification remains feasible without significantly
constraining the driving environment; what’s more, such
inference is practical with off-the-shelf machine learning
techniques readily available to anybody. This is a plausible
scenario when a malicious actor gains access to the car’s
CAN bus through an Internet-connected device such as a
smartphone using a wired or wireless data collector adapter
plugged into the car’s OBD-II connector [1]. For the purpose
of inference, we blindly consider all possible time series that
could be easily extracted from CAN logs without any sort of
manual inspection of their content. We use machine learning
2bit.ly/2V14YkK
3www.wsj.com/articles/what-your-car-knows-about-you-1534564861
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techniques to select time series with sufficient predictive
power and use their combination for classification. Our
solution is scalable and does not require reverse-engineering
the proprietary communication protocol used on the CAN
bus.
Our specific contributions are twofold:
• We demonstrate the feasibility of driver re-identification
even if drivers follow different routes and the exact
signals (such as velocity, acceleration, RPM, etc.) can-
not be extracted directly from the captured CAN log.
We extract a time series from every byte of every
CAN message, from which the ones with the most
predictive power are identified. In particular, we build a
convolution-based neural network, where features from
individual time series are learnt automatically by con-
volutional layers, which are then combined in a mixture
model in order to perform the final classification. We
achieve a mean accuracy of driver classification between
75-85% for CAN traces with a length of less than 2
minutes. By contrast, most prior works [3], [2] achieved
comparable result only with fewer drivers (2-15) and
when the exact signals could be extracted and are
readily available for classification.
• We propose a scalable technique to classify a large set of
time series even if many of the individual time series are
significantly noisy and hence lack sufficient predictive
power individually. Our approach first classifies each
time series separately, and combines the best performing
individual models to classify the whole set of time
series.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Signal Extraction from Controller Area Network (CAN)
The Controller Area Network (CAN) is a bus system
providing in-vehicle communications for ECUs and other
devices [1]. The overwhelming majority of cars use one or
more proprietary CAN protocols. Generally, sensor signals
in CAN variants have a sampling frequency in the order of
10 ms−1, i.e., an ECU packs the measured signal samples
into a CAN message and broadcasts that on the CAN bus
every 10 ms.
CAN messages can be eavesdropped through the standard
on-board diagnostics (OBD, OBD-II) port. Sensor signals
carried by OBD have a sampling frequency in the order of 1
second. However, in certain vehicle makes and models, one
or more CANs are also connected to the OBD-II port. In
such cars (like the one used in this paper), also utilizing OBD
over the CAN physical layer, it is possible to extract fine-
grained CAN data via an OBD-II logger device [1]. Indeed,
collecting in-vehicle network logs is not a privilege of car
companies any more. For example, insurance companies sell
a complete kit which consists of a smartphone application as
well as an ODB-II adapter. This adapter is then voluntarily
installed by the driver and wirelessly connected to the
driver’s smartphone through Bluetooth4.
4Other malicious parties may have access to the driver’s device by
installing a malicious application which then may gain access to the adapter.
TABLE I: Example of CAN messages and the extracted time
series. The red, green, and blue time series are obtained by
extracting the 1st, 4th and 7th byte of every time-ordered
CAN message with ID 0x02c4, respectively.
Timestamp CAN-ID Req Len Data
1481492683.285052 0x0208 000 0x8 0x00 0x00 0x32 0x00 0x0e 0x32 0xfe 0x3c
1481492674.736055 0x02c4 000 0x8 0x82 0xc8 0x00 0x0f 0x03 0x00 0x92 0x3c
1481492674.736055 0x02c4 000 0x8 0x82 0xc9 0x00 0x0f 0x00 0x00 0x92 0x4c
1481492674.736055 0x02c4 000 0x8 0x82 0xcc 0x00 0x0f 0x08 0x00 0x92 0x5a
1497323915.123844 0x018e 000 0x8 0x03 0x03 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x07 0x3f
1497323915.112910 0x00f1 000 0x6 0x28 0x00 0x00 0x40 0x00 0x00
1481492674.736055 0x02c4 000 0x8 0x82 0xd2 0x00 0x0f 0x0c 0x00 0x92 0x5d
1481492674.736055 0x02c4 000 0x8 0x82 0xa1 0x00 0x0f 0xa1 0x00 0x92 0x4d
However, owing to the confidential message format and
semantics, extracting a sensor signal from the captured CAN
messages is not straightforward. Table I shows a simplified
picture of a CAN message5. A CAN bus message has several
components including the timestamp, a message identifier
(CAN-ID), a Remote Transmission Request which allows
ECUs to request messages from other ECUs, and the actual
data field with a size of at most 8 bytes. The Data field can be
broken to sensor signals which are then transformed and/or
converted to a human-readable format in order to enable
further analysis [7].
For example, the position of the brake pedal may be
carried by the fourth byte of the message with ID 0x02c4
in Table I. Therefore, extracting the fourth byte of every
consecutive instance of this message type (ordered by their
timestamp) one can reconstruct the braking signal (i.e.,
position of the brake pedal over time, which is shown in
green in Table I). Importantly, the message ID, offset and
length of a signal are not standardised and kept confidential
by OEMs. Consequently, extracting a signal from recorded
CAN messages would require (partly) reverse-engineering
the specific CAN protocol which may be illegal under
practical circumstances [6].
B. Convolutional Neural Networks for Automatic Feature
Extraction
In recent years, convolutional neural networks (CNNs)
have significantly progressed the fields of audio and visual
pattern recognition [8]. CNNs are capable of automatically
learning complex feature representations using their convolu-
tional layers. Specifically, CNNs produce a set of (learnable)
filters that can recognize patterns in a translation-invariant
way. Suppose f is a filter (or vector) with size n and T is a
time series also represented by a vector of values. Then, the
1-dimensional discrete convolution of f and T is given by
(T ∗ f)[i] =
n∑
j=1
f [n+ 1− j] · T [i+ j − 1]
5This example shows an already stripped message, i.e., we do not discuss
end of frame or check bits.
Filters are learnt in order to extract different features from the
time series using convolution. For instance, if f = [1,−1],
T ∗ f equals the gradient (i.e., difference) between any two
neighboring points. Hence, there is no need to manually
craft such features since the value of T ∗ f (or its simple
functions such as maximum or average) is used as ”features”
and are further fed into a classification model. By changing
the number and size of filters as well as stacking multiple
convolution layers, a CNN can learn to detect many different
local traits of a time series. For example, if T is the velocity,
then convolving T with f = [1,−1] yields the acceleration.
Therefore, by applying max pooling on the convolved signal
the model can learn to distinguish drivers based on their
maximum acceleration. Although, in theory, CNN could
learn many different transformations of the time series such
as discrete Fourier transform, such specific functions are
almost never learnt in practice [9]. It is still an open question
what exact functions are learnable by CNNs.
If (T ∗ f) is evaluated at every point of T , then the same
feature represented by f can be detected along the whole
time series T . This makes CNNs particularly suitable to
detect local features. Indeed, most drivers exhibit only local
distinguishing features (e.g., the short moments when they
accelerate or decelerate) as the signal is globally shaped by
traffic conditions rather than by the driver’s behaviour.
CNNs are also more scalable than traditional fully con-
nected neural networks (FCNNs), because the same filters
are applied along the whole time series, that is, the number
of learnable parameters is proportional to the number and
size of filters and not to the size |T | of the whole time series.
This also makes CNNs less prone to overfitting.
C. Long Short Term Memory Networks
A Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) uses memory to
model short-term dependencies in sequential data. When
folded out in time, it can be considered as a feedforward
deep neural network with indefinitely many layers. RNNs
generally receive input and produce output at each time step.
Long-term temporal dependencies are difficult to model with
RNNs because the gradient of the loss function decays expo-
nentially with time (the vanishing gradient problem). Another
weakness of common RNNs is that they do not explicitly
support multiple time scales, and any temporal hierarchy that
is present in the input signal needs to be embedded implicitly
in the network. However, time series often have a temporal
hierarchy, where the information is scattered over multiple
time scales. Long Short-Term memory (LSTM) networks
[10], a special type of RNNs, overcome the above problems.
The recurrent weights in an LSTM (learnt during the training
phase) select which information they need to pass onwards
vs. which they need to discard. A common LSTM unit is
composed of a cell, an input gate, an output gate and a forget
gate. The cell remembers values over arbitrary time intervals,
while the three gates regulate the flow of information into
and out of the cell.
III. INFERENCE MODEL
A. Overview
Our premise is that the signals represented by the time
series are unknown, therefore, for the purpose of inference,
we use an artificial neural network (ANN), where the features
of a time series are automatically extracted and learnt by
multiple convolution layers. This is advantageous as the
manual feature extraction of an unknown signal would be
difficult otherwise.
We propose a mixture model with two main components:
1) Individual time series (ITS) model: This model is
specialized to the classification of a single time series.
We build one ITS model per time series, hence we
obtain N different ITS models altogether, where N is
the number of all time series. A time series is extracted
by concatenating the same byte of every CAN message
with identical message ID.
2) Mixture model: The already trained ITS models are
combined into a single fully connected decision/ouput
layer which provides the final classification result.
Importantly, ITS models are trained individually and sepa-
rately from the mixture model, which makes our solution
scalable. In particular, each ITS model can be trained in-
dependently and in parallel, and the training of the whole
mixture model does not require to fine-tune or re-train the
already trained ITS models. Once ITS models are trained,
their weights are frozen and not modified during the training
of their mixture model.
Next, we describe the model architecture in more details.
The architecture of our proposal is illustrated in Figure 1.
B. Data augmentation
We first divide the time series into equally-sized segments,
from here on referred to as samples. Given a single sample as
input, our model attempts to classify it into its correct class
(e.g., driver ID). Due to the limited amount of data, and
similarly to prior works [11], [12], we use a sliding window
over the whole time series to create samples. Specifically,
let T = (t1, t2, . . . , t|T |) denote a time series, and let Ti:j =
(ti, ti+1, . . . , tj) be a window of T between positions i and
j (1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ |T |). Then, the set of all n samples created
from T is given by {T1,n, T1+`,n+`, . . . , T|T |−`+1,|T |}, that
is, all consecutive windows shifted by ` time slots.
C. Individual Time Series (ITS) Model
We use a CNN combined with Long Short-Term Memory
(LSTM) [10]. Our ITS model is inspired by [12]; however,
it also differs in several aspects as we explain in Section V.
First, the input sample is divided into equally-sized non-
overlapping k segments. Each segment si of a sample
is transformed into a higher-level representation/features
CNN(si) using the same CNN model. The CNN model is
composed of two 1-dimensional convolutional layers (with
Rectified Linear Unit activations), which are separated by a
max pooling layer in order to reduce model complexity, and a
fully connected layer producing the output of the CNN. The
segment size should be sufficiently large in order to capture
any human driving reaction (e.g., acceleration, deceleration,
gear switching, etc.), but still small enough to focus on
distinctive driver features.
As the ITS model is applied on each segment of the sample
independently, it can only model local features of a segment
except for the sequential information along the sequence of
segments as well as any global features of the whole sample.
For this reason, we use an LSTM layer (with tanh activation)
and it is applied on the sequence of local features extracted
by CNN. In particular, a single CNN model is used to extract
features from every segment si. The sequence of these repre-
sentations are further processed by LSTM, which computes
time-dependent features by transforming the input sequence
into another sequence h1, h2, . . . , hk composed of the hidden
states of the LSTM model. Specifically, for input segment si,
hi = LSTM(CNN(si), hi−1). A hidden state hi is produced
for every input segment si, dependent on the current input
as well as all previous input segments through hi−1. The
sequence of h1, h2, . . . , hk is fed into an attention layer in
order to select those parts of the sequence which represent
distinctive driver features. In particular, a sample may contain
only a few segments with clear distinctive features of the
drivers such as a unique pattern of speeding, steering, or
braking, while the rest may lack any unique driving pattern
and hence bearing less importance in distinguishing drivers.
LSTM is ineffective to model sequential dependencies if
the input sequence is too long (i.e., there are too many seg-
ments), which is alleviated by attention as follows. Several
attention mechanisms have been proposed in the literature
mainly for text classification and machine translation [13],
[14]. In this work, we use a simple mechanism [14] which
provides the best performance for our dataset. The attention
mechanism computes the weighted average of all the hidden
states h1, h2, . . . , hk produced by LSTM along the whole
input sequence. More specifically, the attention mechanism
is defined as
ui = tanh(w
>hi + b)
αi =
exp(ui)∑
i exp(ui)
a =
∑
i
αihi
where w ∈ Rk and b ∈ R are jointly learnt parameters,
and ai is the attention vector which represents sample i. In
essence, a is the weighted average of each segment’s LSTM
representation, where the weights are a non-linear function of
these representations. This function is modeled by a shallow
neural network with weights w and bias b.
Finally, the attention vector a is provided to a fully con-
nected layer with tanh activation, whose output is then given
to a final softmax (multi-class classification) or a sigmoid
layer (binary classification). We apply dropout regularization
on every fully connected layer of our model.
D. Mixture model
ITS models classify individual time series and therefore
each can have very different predictive performance. Indeed,
some time series contain more distinctive driver features
(e.g., brake pedal position) than others (e.g., velocity). In
fact, it turns out that the majority of time series often do not
have any predictive power at all.
We combine ITS models into a single Mixture model by
connecting all ITS models to the same fully-connected neural
layer, called mixture layer, whose output provides the final
prediction. We first remove the output layer of the already
trained ITS models, and merge the remaining part into the
mixture layer. Finally, the whole mixture model is trained
by adjusting the weights of only the mixture layer while
keeping all parameters of the individual models intact. In
case there are too many ITS models and the training of the
mixture model is not feasible due to memory constraints,
only the top-K best performing ITS models are used in the
mixture. Also, the trained ITS models can be compressed by
distillation [15].
In fact, our mixture model is a sort of committee machine
[16], where multiple neural networks, called as experts, are
combined to provide the final classification. Indeed, each
ITS model is an expert which is specialized to extract a
high -level representation of a single time-series. These
representations are non-linearly combined to produce the
classification.
The benefit of the mixture layer is to model inter-
dependencies between different time series which may im-
prove classification accuracy. For example, the acceleration
and deceleration patterns individually may not be unique to
a driver but their combination is.
IV. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate our mixture model described
in Section III.
A. Dataset
As CAN data logs are not widely available, we conducted
a measurement campaign. For data collection in particular we
connected a logging device to the OBD-II port and logged all
observed messages from various ECUs. Such a device acts
as a node on the CAN bus and is able to read and store all
broadcast messages. Our team developed both the logging
device (based on a Raspberry PI 3) and the logging software
(in C).6
Most routes were driven inside or close to Budapest;
approximately 15-20% was recorded on a motorway. Drivers
were free to choose their way, but still conforming to three
practical requirements: (1) record at least 15 minutes of
driving in total, (2) do not record data when driving up
and down hills, (3) do not record data in extremely heavy
traffic (short runs and idling). Free driving was recorded for
6Note that it is common that the OBD-II connector is found under the
steering wheel. Also note that not all car makes and models connect the
CAN serving the drive-train ECUs (or any CAN) to the OBD-II port (e.g.,
Volkswagen, BMW, etc.).
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Fig. 1: Our mixture model.
all 33 drivers with an Opel Astra 2018: 11 people were
between the age of 20-30, 8 of 25-30, 7 of 35-40 and and
7 above 40; there were 5 women and 28 men; 12 with less
experience (less than 7000 km per year on average or novice
driver), 11 with average experience (8-20000 km per year),
and 10 with above average experience (more than 20000
km per year). All drivers drove between 10am and 4pm on
weekdays and the average trace length is 29.81 minutes with
a standard deviation of 13.48, the shortest trace is 17.71
minutes long, whereas the longest trace is 85 minutes long.
The data were collected with the users’ explicit consent
after informing them about the purpose of the study. Exact
identity of drivers was not recorded except for their personal
attributes described above. Traces of different drivers were
linked together using random identifiers.
B. Extracting time series from CAN logs
The CAN logs of all drivers contain 53 different message
IDs from which we extract 72 different time series per driver.
More specifically, we consider all single bytes of every
message, and a single time series corresponds to the series of
bytes retrieved from the same byte position of all consecutive
messages with the same message ID, which is also illustrated
in Table I. We dropped all time series (1) with a single
TABLE II: Dataset summary.
Attribute Value Population
Gender Male 28Female 5
Age
[20-25] 11
[25-30] 8
[30-40] 7
[40-70] 7
Experience
Low 12
Average 11
High 10
constant value in all time slots, (2) that were too short,
(3) contained the values of counters. We retained the time
series which occur in each driver’s trace. This pre-processing
finally yields 72 time series per driver. Accordingly, we built
72 different ITS models, each corresponding to a single
time series. The validation accuracy of each ITS model is
evaluated, and the top-10 best performing ITS models are
selected and used in the mixture model.
C. Training and Testing data
In order to train an ITS model which is specialized for the
classification of a single time series, we build two datasets
T and S, which are further used to create the training and
testing datasets for any classification problem as follows.
First, each time series of every driver is divided into two
parts. Samples extracted from the first part of every trace,
using the sliding window technique described in Section III-
B, are added to T. S is created analogously from the second
part of every trace. Since the size of the first part is always set
to 80% of the whole trace, the training samples will roughly
cover 80% of all the samples from all drivers. Training data
is obtained by picking an identical number of samples per
class from T, and testing data is generated from S. These
guarantee that (1) the training and testing sets do not overlap,
(2) training data is always balanced, and (3) the proportion
of samples from a driver is identical both in the training and
the testing data (i.e., there is no dataset shift).
D. Hyperparameters
Sample sizes are varied among 20, 60, and 120 seconds,
and consecutive samples are shifted by 0.1 second. For ITS
models, samples are divided into non-overlapping segments
with a size of 3 seconds, which is believed to be suffi-
cient to capture the most important driving actions. Each
convolutional layer has a kernel size corresponding to 0.5
seconds with a stride of 0.05 seconds. The first convolution
layer has 20 filters while the second layer applied on the
output of the first layer has 40 filters followed by batch
normalization [17]. Max pooling is applied on the result
of every 5 consecutive convolution operations of the first
layer. All FCNNs are composed of 64 units, and the number
of LSTM’s hidden states is 16. ITS models are trained as
long as validation accuracy improved: 2 epochs for ITS
models and 4 epochs for the Mixture model on average.
All models are trained with RMSprop7 with a fixed learning
rate of 0.001. The output layers use softmax activation for
multi-class classification and sigmoid activation for binary
classification, which are optimized against categorical and
binary cross-entropy, respectively, for all models.
E. Results
We use the model described in Section III for all clas-
sification tasks8. To measure performance on the testing
data, we define testing accuracy as all correct classifications
(TP+TN, True Positive plus True Negative) divided by all
classifications:
Acc =
TP + TN
All
1) 1-vs-all: Table III shows the re-identification accuracy
in the 1-vs-all scenario, i.e., when one driver is distinguished
from all other drivers with a single binary mixture model.
We show the mean value over all 33 drivers (i.e., the mean
accuracy over all the 33 models), standard deviation, and
the extreme values for a specific driver. It is easy to see that
7www.cs.toronto.edu/˜tijmen/csc321/slides/
lecture_slides_lec6.pdf
8We implemented our model in Python 3.6.7 using the framework of
Keras 2.2.2. Evaluation was done on commodity hardware with Intel Core
i7-4770 CPU and 32 GB RAM, where the average time training of a mixture
model is 294 sec, and one ITS is trained in 157 sec on average. A powerful
GPU can considerably speed up training.
TABLE III: Re-identification accuracy: 1-vs-all
Sample length Mean Std.dev. Max Min
20 s 0.758 0.017 0.949 0.432
60 s 0.829 0.019 0.995 0.436
120 s 0.847 0.025 1.000 0.465
TABLE IV: Re-id. accuracy: 1-vs-all, sample length: 60 secs
Attribute Value Persons Mean Std Max Min
Gender Male 28 0.814 0.140 0.995 0.436Female 5 0.911 0.099 0.968 0.734
Age
[20-25] 11 0.840 0.106 0.939 0.573
[25-30] 8 0.788 0.184 0.973 0.436
[30-40] 7 0.892 0.143 0.995 0.606
[40-70] 7 0.806 0.126 0.969 0.586
Experience
Low 12 0.834 0.108 0.968 0.573
Average 11 0.799 0.172 0.964 0.436
High 10 0.860 0.135 0.995 0.586
accuracy improves sublinearly with the length of the sample
trace, the mean ranging from 75% up to 85%. Maximum
accuracy values for the most correctly classified driver are
between 95% and 100%, while minimum values for the
hardest-to-classify driver are between 43% and 46%.
Table IV depicts the 1-vs-all re-identification accuracy
depending on the personal attribute values, which include
gender, age, and driving experience. Interestingly, the most
experienced drivers are the easiest to distinguish from all the
other drivers with a mean accuracy of 86%, which shows
that, by practicing, people tend to develop more unique skill
sets. This phenomenon has also been confirmed in other
domains [18].
2) Many-vs-all: Fig. 2 shows the re-identification accu-
racy in the many-vs-all scenario, i.e., when a group of drivers
is distinguished from all other drivers with a single multi-
class mixture model, further characterizing the performance
of our method. In the 2-vs-all case, we randomly select 50
different groups of 2 drivers out of the possible
(
33
2
)
, and plot
the mean value and the standard deviation; we do similarly
with group sizes of 4, 10 and 33 (with only 1 possible
allocation in the last, all-vs-all case). Notice that all-vs-all
corresponds to the case when each driver is distinguished
from each other using a single model. We observe that
the mean value of accuracy is higher when the group size
is smaller, ranging from the highest mean of 40% (all-vs-
all, trace length 60 s) up to 91% (2-vs-all, trace length
20 s). It is interesting that a larger sample length does
not always translate into higher accuracy; in fact, in almost
all displayed cases the highest mean accuracy comes from
models built on 60 s long samples (the exception to the rule
is the 4-vs-all case, where the 120 s sample length yields
slightly better results). Note that even in the hardest, all-vs-all
case, our approach provides a 13-fold accuracy improvement
compared to the 1/33 = 3.03% baseline.
V. RELATED WORK
In this section, we give an overview on the related work
with regard to driver re-identification and neural network
based time series classification.
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Fig. 2: Re-identification accuracy: many-vs-all
A. Driver re-identification
Driver characterization based on driving data has gathered
significant research interest from both the automotive control
and the data privacy domain. In automotive control, substan-
tial research efforts were made in modeling and recognizing
driver behavior based on CAN and other driving data with
the objective of designing and improving intelligent vehicle
systems and providing enhanced driver safety features [19],
[20]. On the other hand, the potential re-identification of
drivers (i.e., singling out) based on recorded CAN data also
became a focus for data privacy research [2]. The common
trait in these works is the presumed familiarity with the
specific CAN protocol stack including the presentation and
application layers giving the researchers access to sensor
signals. This knowledge is usually gained via access to the
OEM’s documentations in the framework of some research
cooperation. As such, researchers do not disclose such infor-
mation to honor their contract and preserve confidentiality.
Miyajima et al. collected and investigated sensor signals
in both a driving simulator and a real vehicle. Using car-
following patterns and spectral features of pedal operation
signals authors achieved an identification rate of 89.6% for
the simulator (12 drivers) and 76.8% (276 drivers) for the
field test. Hallac et al. [21] discovered that maneuvers during
turning could fingerprint drivers using a dataset provided by
Audi. Via the same dataset, Fugiglando et al. [22] showed
that four behavioral traits, namely braking, turning, speeding
and fuel efficiency could characterize a driver adequately
well. Zhang et al. [5] developed a driver classification model
based on both CAN and mobile phone sensor data. While
effective for distinguishing between pairs of drivers, authors
claim that their method does not scale well. Enev et al. [2]
make use of mostly statistical features as an input for binary
(one-vs-one) classification with regard to driving behavior.
These binary classifiers are combined into a multi-class
classifier, which is not a scalable approach if there is a large
number of drivers. Driving the same car in a constrained
parking lot setting and a longer but fixed route, authors re-
identified their 15 drivers with 100% accuracy. Authors had
access to all available sensor signals and their scaling and
offset parameters from the manufacturer’s documentation.
Fugiglando et al. [23] developed a new methodology for
near-real-time classification of driver behavior in an uncon-
trolled setting. Despite their advanced use of unsupervised
machine learning techniques they conclude that clustering
drivers based on their behavior remains a challenging prob-
lem.
B. Time series classification with neural networks
The field of time series classification (TSC) has pro-
posed a multitude of algorithms. These algorithms are ei-
ther distance-based, using k-NN classifiers over distance
measures between time series; or feature-based, extracting
deterministic features in either the time domain or spectrum
and applying traditional classification algorithms. Lately,
ensemble methods using multiple classifiers have also been
studied. An overview and comparative performance evalu-
ation of these methods are presented in [24]. Using neural
networks is a novel direction in TSC [11], [25], [26], [27].
In order to perform adequately, these methods require either
additional pre-processing of the input signals or very large
datasets. For a comparative performance evaluation we refer
the reader to the work of Fawaz et al. [27].
Our proposed classifier is most similar to the DeepSense
framework [12] and the Multi-channels Deep Convolutional
Neural Networks (MC-DCNN) [28]. Both works use CNNs
to extract features from multiple time series which are
fed into a Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP) [28] or a Gated
Recurrent Unit (GRU) [12]. Our mixture model can be
considered as a synergy of these two approaches. Unlike
DeepSense [12] which applies 2 dimensional convolution on
multiple time series, we apply 1 dimensional convolution on
individual time series which are then combined in a fully
connected layer as in MC-DCNN. We found this approach
to be superior especially if many of the input time series are
noisy and have no predictive power at all. Our approach can
also be used to localize the parts of CAN messages which
indeed identify a driver. Our model is also simpler (has fewer
parameters) and hence is less prone to overfitting. Unlike
MC-DCNN, we use LSTM with an attention layer per time
series to focus on its most distinctive parts.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Our study demonstrates that driver re-identification re-
mains feasible even without the manual inspection of mes-
sages captured on the CAN bus. In other words, profiling
drivers can be performed even without reverse-engineering
the CAN protocol.
The empirical evaluation of our approach on a dataset of
33 drivers demonstrates that a driver can be recognized with
a success probability of 85% based on a mere 2 minutes of
driving in urban areas, even if drivers follow different routes.
Our findings include that drivers with substantial experience
are the easiest to distinguish. As features are extracted
automatically using convolutional neural networks, we con-
jecture that our technique is also applicable to predicting
various other driver attributes such as age, gender, or driving
experience; however, the necessary empirical justification
would require a significantly larger dataset.
Our study does not only raise the flag to car drivers, but
also to companies collecting in-vehicle network logs; the
re-identification (and/or profiling) of drivers so effortlessly
means that CAN logs indeed constitute personal data and,
as such, are subject to the European General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) [29] as of 25 May 2018. It remains
an open problem whether more sensitive attributes such as
health status are also predictable from CAN logs.
Our work also advocates the widespread adoption of
standardized security protocols for the protection of CAN
network traffic [30]. Although ad hoc solutions like dis-
persing the bits of a sensor signal within a CAN message
would make our approach less effective, we conjecture
that extracting signals from such obfuscated CAN messages
remains feasible with appropriate statistical approaches.
It also remains an open problem whether captured CAN
logs can be effectively anonymized. Although car companies
stress that the collected network logs are “anonymized”,
the proper anonymization of such high-dimensional data is
notoriously difficult in practice without significantly degrad-
ing accuracy [31]. We believe that most viable approaches
include the release of aggregate noisy statistics with provable
privacy guarantees [32].
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